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Abstract
The emergence of old-age social security has been linked to general fertility decline, and in recent 
years pension reforms have emerged as a response to the challenges of population ageing, in turn 
partially a consequence of fertility decline. Understanding the link between social security and low 
fertility is therefore very important. In this paper we analyse the link between fertility and social 
security in a novel way. We exploit a series of pension reforms that were implemented in Italy, one of 
the first ‘lowest-low’ fertility societies, during the 1990s, to test the effect of expected retirement 
income on fertility. The design of the reforms, which introduced a discontinuity depending on the 
numbers of years of contributions, allows considering them as a natural experiment. We analyse 
fertility data reconstructed from a series of surveys from the Bank of Italy and show that couples in 
which the husband was affected by the reform, therefore facing a lower pension, had subsequently 
higher fertility.
Keywords: old-age security, quantity-quality trade-off, public pension systems, fertility, altruism.
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Introduction
The long-term decline of fertility within the demographic transition has been associated, in many 
western societies, with the rise of modern social security. The basic idea is that while children before 
the demographic transition were essential to insure old-age security, this motive has disappeared and 
intergenerational wealth flows have reversed. On top of this long-term trend, during the last two/three 
decases, pressures on social security, mostly induced by population ageing, have pushed towards a 
season of social security reforms, essentially aiming at lowering expected income from retirement 
pensions. Some of these reforms have been implemented in low and very low fertility societies, like 
Italy—the setting of our study. Understanding the effect of these social security reforms is therefore 
crucial both from a policy-oriented empirical perspective, i.e. what is the future of fertility in societies 
where younger generations face lower income from retirement, and from a fertility theory perspective, 
i.e. what theories can better explain fertility decision in a context of longer lives and lower pensions.
Pension reforms are particularly suited to test economic theories of childbearing. A decrease in 
expected future pension benefits that is not matched by a corresponding reduction in social security 
contributions induces a clear, negative income effect—which might affect fertility decisions. Moreover, 
to the extent that future pension benefits are linked to current labor income, incentives to work may 
also be reduced by a decrease in the future pension generosity. This latter effect amounts to a reduction 
in the opportunity cost of fertility—as long as that raising kids requires parental time. While a 
reduction in opportunity costs is, from a theoretical perspective, associated with higher fertility, the 
former, pure negative income effect associated with a reduction in the pension benefits leads instead to 
different predictions under different fertility theories. In this paper, we analyze the effect on fertility 
choices of a sequence of Italian pension reforms during the 1990s, which largely decreased future 
pension benefits, while leaving social security contributions virtually unchanged and introducing 
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discontinuities that create a “natural experiment”. Italy represents a particularly interesting case for the 
study of fertility choices. Together with Spain, Italy has been the first country to steadily experience 
fertility levels below a threshold defined of lowest-low fertility (a total fertility rate of 1.3 children per 
woman or below) during the 1990s (Kohler, Billari and Ortega 2002). The period of lowest fertility 
levels coincided, in particular in Italy, with the period of implementation of the two reforms
(Caltabiano, Castiglioni and Rosina 2009).
In our empirical analyses, we exploit several features of the Italian family structure, labor market and 
pension reforms to identify the causal effects of the reforms on fertility. First, in order to single out the 
pure negative income effects induced by the Italian pension reforms, we concentrate on the fertility 
decisions of couples, in which the male is a dependent worker, whose future pension benefits may (or 
may not) have been affected by the reforms. For these workers, due to institutional constraints in the 
Italian labor market, no (marginal) incentive effect is at work, since dependent workers are only able to 
modify their labor supply in discrete jumps, namely by choosing between not working, working part-
time or full time. Moreover, the division of labor within Italian families during the 1990s was still such 
that the care of the children was almost entirely provided by the mothers. Hence, if a change of 
incentives might have emerged from the reform, it would at most have affected the female workers. 
Second, the design of the reform introduced a clear discontinuity in the size of future pension benefits 
across workers. Pension benefits of the individuals with 15 years of contributions or more at the end of 
1992 were not modified, while pension entitlements were largely reduced for all other workers on a 
pro-quota basis, which took into account their contributory history. A discontinuity that affected 
exactly the same cohorts of workers was then introduced by the Dini reform in 1995. The magnitude of 
the discontinuity is sizeable. Due to the reforms, a one-year difference in the length of contributions in 
1992 (14 vs. 15 years) for two individuals with otherwise the same characteristics commanded a 
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difference in the pension replacement rate (measured as the ratio between the pension benefit and the 
last wage prior to retirement) of around 15 points -- that is, a replacement rate of 80% for the individual 
with 15 years in contributions in 1992 versus 65% for the other individual. This discontinuity may 
allow to identify a causal effect of income on fertility.
We concentrate on the effect of the reforms on the male workers, for whom we can identify a clear, 
negative income effect, while controlling for the effects on the female workers. We find a strong 
positive effect of the pension reform on the average number of post-reform children and on the 
probability of having a kid after the reform. More specifically, affected individuals are estimated to 
have 10.7% higher fertility after the reforms with respect to the unaffected ones. Sensitivity analyses 
confirm the robustness of our findings.
Our results have relevant implications. First, they constitute a clean causal evidence of a link running 
from public pension systems to fertility decisions: lower pension benefits increase fertility. Along these 
lines, our analysis might contribute to explaining, at least in part, recent fertility trends, including the 
(mild) reversal towards high fertility, which has been observed in Italy since the mid-1990s. Moreover, 
it also suggests that in many developed societies, at least where family ties matter, the strong 
decreasing trend in fertility may be partially due to the large rise in pension spending. Second, our 
empirical findings hint to the fact that either the old-age security motive or the Becker-Lewis (1973)
version of the "consumption" theory matter for fertility decisions in a key contemporary low fertility 
society.
Social security and motives for fertility
The family economics approach, pioneered by Becker (1960), suggests that individuals obtain direct 
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pleasure from having and raising children, and from their well-being. Kids, and possibly their quality 
level, thus resemble a consumption good in the utility function of their parents. Evidence that genetic 
endowments influence the propensity to have children are consistent with this view (Kohler, Behrman 
and Skytthe 2005). However, the initial formulation of Becker’s theory delivered a positive correlation 
between fertility and family income, which has not been supported in either cross-section or time-series 
data. The large literature that followed has emphasized two crucial aspects: a quantity-quality trade-off 
and the role of the cost of parental time (Guinnane 2011; Jones, Schoonbroodt and Tertilt 2011). Along 
the former lines, Becker and Lewis (1973) showed that an increase in income may lead to fewer 
children, but of higher quality. This is because rich parents value kids' quality, but higher quality 
increases the cost of having (and raising) kids, and may thus lead to lower fertility. The "price of time" 
consumption theory suggests that, since raising kids requires parental time, fertility is more costly for 
high-income parents, who thus choose to have fewer kids. Some theories that postulate heterogeneity in 
tastes for kids argue that the negative income-fertility correlation is caused by individuals with a strong 
taste for kids dedicating more time and effort to their family and less to acquire market skills and 
income---this is idea is in line with the “preference theory” approach of Catherine Hakim (Hakim 2003;
Vitali et al. 2009).
Pensions have long been linked to fertility decision-making in the literature. For instance, Sinn (2004)
argued in favor of public pension systems as they provide insurance against the risk of not having 
children, or of having ungrateful children, who are unwilling (or unable) to care for their old parents. 
Yet, as also suggested by Sinn, a drawback of public pension systems is that, even in households with 
grateful children, they tend to reduce kids-to-parents transfers. Parents have an incentive to free ride on 
the social security contributions paid by other people's children. As a result, with the spread of old-age 
social security fertility falls. Empirical studies on the negative correlation between fertility and various 
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measures of the size or the generosity of the public pension system has been since some decades 
(Cigno and Rosati 1992; Galasso, Gatti and Profeta 2009; Hohm 1975). In a study that is particularly 
relevant for what we do, Gábos, Gál and Kézdi (2009) have used aggregate time-series data from post-
war Hungary, comparing the effect of pensions and of child-related benefits on fertility, and estimate
that a 1-per-cent increase in pensions would decrease fertility by 0.2 per cent, while a 1-percent 
increase in child-related benefits would increase it by the same amount.
The old-age security motive for fertility focuses on intergenerational flows within the family and 
considers children as an investment (or "production") good (Boldrin and Jones 2002; Cain 1981;
Caldwell 1978; Leibenstein 1957; Neher 1971). Parents may decide to have children because they 
expect to receive back a (monetary or in-kind) transfer from them in their old age. In this case, altruism 
runs from the kids towards their parents. Rare empirical contributions have provided evidence in favor 
of the old-age security motive in contemporary societies, which should be particularly relevant in 
societies where family ties are more binding and/or no reliable saving instruments are available
(Cunningham et al. 2013). Boldrin, De Nardi and Jones (2005) quantify the effect of the rise in pension 
spending on fertility trends. According to their model, around 50% of the long-term drop in fertility in 
the US is accounted for by the pension system. .D÷LWoLEDúL (1982) argued that old-age security was not 
a reason for fertility in societies such as Germany and the U.S. during the 1970s, despite this motive 
having been cited as somewhat important or very important by 32 percent of married German women 
and 27 percent of married U.S. women during interviews. 
Rendall and Bahchieva (1998) point out the potentially high relevance of old-age security motives in 
contemporary developed societies. They provide an extensive documentation of the relevance of 
children for providing support to their elderly parents in contemporary U.S: 11 percent of all unmarried 
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elderly in the U.S. live above poverty only because of co-residence with adult children, and observed 
poverty rates would double in absence of such co-residence. Consistently, McGarry and Schoeni find 
that the increase of social security benefits in the U.S. has contributed to rising residential 
independence of elderly widows (McGarry and Schoeni 2000). Co-residence is therefore a crucial way 
to transfer income from adult children to their elderly parents also in the US, a country that has almost 
the same strength of family ties as Italy, according to the measure of Alesina and Giuliano (2007).
Recent analyses of comparative data on support for parents show that, in countries with strong family 
ties, help to parents is more widespread (Kalmijn and Saraceno 2008). In a 1998 Eurobarometer survey, 
76 percent of adult Italians state that in the future working adults may have to look after their parents 
more than they do now, 52 percent that a needy elderly parent should co-reside with a child, 23 percent 
state that children should have the main economic responsibility when elderly parents are in need 
(Kalmijn and Saraceno 2008). Despite its relevance, however, systematic empirical evidence of the 
existence of the old-age security motive for fertility in contemporary developed societies is lacking up 
to date.
Setting: Italian pension reforms
A sequence of major pension reforms took place in Italy in the 90s, after that pension spending had 
almost reached 15% of GDP, thereby becoming one of the largest in the world. The pension system 
featured also a large deficit, since yearly contributions were not sufficient to finance yearly benefits, 
and large transfers from the central government were needed to balance the budget. Faced with the 
expectations of further aging and financial crisis, the Italian system was hence largely re-designed, 
mainly through the Amato reform in 1992 and the Dini reform in 1995 (see Table 1 for details).
The Amato reform introduced a gradual tightening, over a ten-year period, of the eligibility 
requirements. Retirement age was increased to 60 years for women and to 65 years for men, and the 
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minimum contribution period for pension eligibility was extended to 20 years. Moreover, the minimum 
contribution period for being eligible to an early retirement pension was extended to 35 years for all 
(private and public) workers. These measures introduced a clear and sizeable negative income effect. 
The reference wage in the pension benefit formula moved from the average wage over the last five 
years prior to retirement to the average wage during the entire working carrier, with past earnings 
capitalized at the cost of living index plus 1% per year. This typically caused a reduction in the 
reference wage, due to the labor earning profile being increasing in age (Galasso 2006). Since pension 
benefits were calculated as the product between the number of years of contributions, this reference 
wage, and a rate of return of two per cent per year, the accrual rate associated with one additional year 
of contribution decreases in those working years in which the wage was below the average wage 
calculated in the five years prior to retirement. The accrual rates were hence typically reduced in 
youth2. Pension benefit indexation moved from nominal wages to prices. Social security contributions 
slightly increased, from 24.5% to 27%, although this was mostly due to the relabeling of existing 
contribution items.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
However, most of these reforms applied only to some cohorts of (young) workers. In fact, the benefit 
calculations for the workers with at least 15 years of contributions at the end of 1992 were untouched, 
and access to early retirement remained virtually the same. For workers with fewer years of seniority, 
instead, the new rules were applied pro-quota. Only to individuals who entered the labor market in 
1993 were the new rules entirely applied. Hence, this reform design gave raise to large differences in 
2The changes in the accrual rates introduced by the Dini reform reinforced the effects of the Amato 
reform.
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the reduction of social security wealth across workers with different seniorities, as well as across public 
and private employees, who initially enjoyed different treatments.
To better understand this discontinuity, consider two male, dependent workers in the private sector with 
a high-school degree, who entered the labor market at the same age (20), and featured the same labor 
earning profile. However, they were born one year apart and thus had different years of contributions at 
the end of 1992. While Mr. Old is one year older -- he was born in 1957 -- and already had 15 years of 
contributions, Mr. Middle (born in 1958) only had 14. Suppose that they will both retire at age 60 upon 
reaching forty years of contributions. Mr. Old will then retire in 2017 and his pension benefits will 
entirely be calculated according to the pre-reform rules. His replacement rate -- that is, the share of his 
labor income at age 59 replaced by the pension benefit -- would be around 80%. Mr. Middle will 
instead retire a year later, in 2018. His pension benefits will be calculated for almost two thirds (26/40) 
according to the new rules, and only for the remaining part (14/40) according to the pre-Amato reform 
scheme. For Mr. Middle, the replacement rate would only be around 70%. This amounts to a large 
discontinuity: the pension treatment of individuals who at the end of 1992 differed in one year of 
contribution only was set to be noticeably large. Analogously, Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) 
estimated that, in the private sector, the drop in social security wealth due to the Amato reform was 
equal to 27.6% for workers born after 1957 and to 17% for those born between 1945 and 1957. This 
reduction was even larger among the public employees: respectively 32.1% for the younger workers 
and 27.1% for the 1945-1957 generation.
In 1995, the Dini reform completely redesigned the architecture of the Italian social security system, 
shifting from defined benefit (DB) to notional defined contribution (NDC), in which returns on social 
security contributions are not fixed (as in the previous DB system), but depend on the growth rate of 
10
the economy. Social security contributions were increased to 33%, although this large raise was due to 
regrouping existing contributions under the social security contribution rate. Eligibility criteria were 
also largely revised. Seniority pensions, whose eligibility was exclusively based on reaching a 
minimum contribution period, were abolished. Under the private employees' scheme, the minimum 
number of years of contribution to be eligible for a pension was reduced to 5 years only; however, only 
individuals aged between 57 and 65 years are entitled to a pension. Again, these retrenchment measures 
induced to a negative and sizable income effect.
As for the Amato reform, these measures were introduced along a transition path that left workers with 
at least 18 years of contributions at the end of 1995 unaffected. The less senior workers were affected 
pro-quota, while workers entering the labor market in 1996 were completely embedded into the new 
system. Interestingly, the same workers who escaped the retrenchment of the Dini reform had already 
slipped through the Amato reform. Returning to our example, while Mr. Old maintained his (expected) 
replacement rate of 80%, Mr. Middle only had 17 years of contributions in 1995 and thus had to face a 
further reduction in his (expected) pension benefits. Leaving his retirement age unchanged at 60 years, 
his replacement rate would in fact drop to around 65%.
The literature has exploited the peculiar discontinuity and the related natural experiment created by the 
Italian (Amato and Dini) pension reforms. These contributions include Attanasio and Brugiavini 
(2003), who estimate the effect of the reduction in pension benefits on savings, Bottazzi, Jappelli and 
Padula (2006), who analyze the impact on retirement decisions, Manacorda and Moretti (2006), who 
concentrate on the decision of young children to leave the parental home, and Battistin et al. (2009), 
who investigate the size of the consumption drop at retirement. Bottazzi et al. (2006) assessed the 
differential impact of the Amato and Dini reforms on three classes of workers: those with a seniority of 
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18 years in 1995 (and 15 in 1992), those with a lower seniority and those who entered the labor market 
after 1995. The differences in the reduction of their replacement rate -- as measured by the ratio of 
pension benefit to the average wage in the last five years prior to retirement -- are quite large. Among 
the private employees retiring at age 60, the replacement rate is reduced by 1 point (from 67.3% to 
66.3%) for the senior workers, by 9.1 points (from 67.3% to 58.2%) for the less senior and by 12.4 
points for the young. The impact is larger among public sector employees, with a drop of 5.1 points 
among the senior, of 20.6 among the less senior and of 26.7 among the young.
These major changes did not come unperceived, nor was the differential impact of the reform across 
generation of workers underplayed. Quite the opposite. Massive strikes broke out in 1992 and 1994,
and a large debate took place in the press. Moreover, estimates by Bottazzi et al. (2006) suggest that 
private employees were well aware of the magnitude of the reform and of the fact that its differential 
impact depended on the years of contributions. In particular, less senior private employees expecting to 
retire at age 60 quite accurately forecasted their replacement rate to be reduced by 8.4 points. The 
relevance of these reforms and their differential effect is also evident in the workers' intention to 
postpone retirement after the reform. Consistently with this differential effect, Bottazzi et al. (2006) 
estimate the increase in the expected retirement age to be larger for middle aged (born after 1957) than 
for more senior workers.
Data and modelling strategy
Data
In order to assess the effect of pension reforms in Italy on fertility choices, we compare individuals 
who are affected by these reforms and individuals who are not affected. We therefore exploit the 
discontinuity discussed in the previous section. We analyze two specific datasets that we build using 
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data from the Bank of Italy's Survey of Italian Households' Income and Wealth (SHIW from now 
onwards). This is a biannual survey, with some individuals repeatedly interviewed, which mostly 
collects, as the title says, data on income and wealth of Italian households. Crucial for our identification 
strategy is the fact that the SHIW contains data, provided by respondents, on the total number of years 
each household member has contributed to the pension system (at December 31st of the reference year 
of the survey). Given the strong attachment of Italian men to the labor market, we assume that the 
number of years of contributions at December 31st 1992 (or 1995), i.e., the reform reference date, can 
be derived from the number of years of contributions at December 31st 1992+ , where  
=6,8,10,12,14, depending on the most recent SHIW wave for which a given respondent was 
interviewed. For example, a person who has at least 27 years of contributions in 2004 (December 31st) 
is assumed to have had at least 15 years of years of contributions in 1992 (December 31st) -- and 
therefore to be unaffected by the reforms. On the contrary, a person who has 26 years of contributions 
in 2004 is assumed to have less than 15 years of contributions in 1992 -- and thus to be affected by the 
reforms. 
reformM is a therefore a simple dichotomous variable representing the treatment effect in this natural-
experiment setting. Recall bias and lack of precision in reporting years of contributions certainly induce 
measurement error in the identification of the treatment and control group. However, the bias of such 
measurement error implies an underestimation of the effect of the reform, therefore the subsequent 
results might be conservative3. We use this strategy to identify affected and unaffected men. 
Fertility is considered as a household decision. We focus on households with individuals who were 
married at the time of the surveys, and evaluate the effect of the reform primarily focusing on men as 
3The lack of more precise data on contributions (e.g. months, or weeks) prevents us from adopting a 
full regression discontinuity design in subsequent analyses.
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the affected or unaffected individuals. The focus on married couples should not bias our results, given 
the particularly low extra-marital birth rates and divorce rates during the period covered (see, e.g., 
Castiglioni and Dalla Zuanna, 2008).
We also build a similar reformF for the wives of affected individuals, in order to control for incentive 
effects that might have affected women (although this is not useful to test alternative theories of 
fertility). Given the low labor force attachment of Italian women during the period we are studying, 
however, there are very few women who are not affected by the reform during their childbearing ages. 
Moreover, the indicator is only poorly measured for women, since it is based on the less likely 
assumption of a continuous labor force attachment between the time of the reform and the time of the 
survey. We however choose to keep this indicator to test the robustness of our results concerning the 
impact on husbands.
We exploit additional data provided by the SHIW, such as the date of births of all household members, 
including husband, wife, and co-resident children. Moreover, we use data on the number (although not 
the date of birth) of non-resident children. In our analyses, we also include other control variables, such 
as educational level of both partners and the area of birth of the husband. We can reconstruct the 
couple's fertility history by using the date of birth of co-resident children. All non co-resident children 
are born before the time of the first reform, i.e. up to 1992 (this assumption does not affect subsequent 
results as we focus on childbirths from 1993 onwards). These assumptions are relatively mild in the 
case of Italy where children tend to co-reside with parents for a long time (well into their mid 20s). We 
only use data on household with wives born in 1955 or after (who are therefore not older than 41 in 
1996).
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The reforms affected couples in what in Italy are central childbearing ages. In our sample, men in 
married couples who had 15 years of contribution at the end of 1992 had on average about 35 years of 
age (to be precise, their average age in 1992 was 34.45 years). Their wives were on average 3.8 years 
younger (the average age of the wife in 1992 was 30.67 years). This age interval is particularly 
relevant, in contemporary Italy, for fertility choices. Although we later provide specific figures on the 
dataset we use, it is useful here to recall that fertility at ages 30+ has been increasing ever since the mid 
1980s. Indeed, Italy has become the leading industrialized country in late childbearing (Billari et al., 
2007). This is a clear consequence of the postponement of childbearing, a phenomenon that 
accompanies (and partly causes) the emergence of lowest-low fertility, and that is linked to a -- at least 
partial -- recuperation of the postponed births at later ages. It is therefore increasingly important, in the 
explanation of fertility, to understand the motives of childbearing of women aged 30 and over.
Modelling Strategy
We perform a series of simple t-tests in order to compare the mean fertility of individuals who are just 
before (up to a year) and just after (up to a year) the threshold (15 years of contributions at the end of 
1992, 18 years of contributions at the end of 1995) using information available or reconstructed at the 
time of the surveys. Table 2 contains the results of these tests on individuals who are as close to the 
discontinuity as we could get, performed on a sample of 200 unaffected individuals and 198 affected 
individuals. Indeed, while the number of children prior to 1993 is not significantly different between 
the two groups, fertility after the reforms is significantly higher for the treated. More specifically, up to 
1993 unaffected individuals have on average 1.39 children, while affected individuals have on average 
1.38 children. After 1993, affected individuals have on average 0.49 children, while unaffected 
individuals have on average 0.31 children during the same period, which includes the effect of both 
reforms. The average number of children up to 2006 for affected individuals (1.87) is 10.6% higher 
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than the total number of children for unaffected individuals (1.69). Our first evidence is therefore in 
favor of a significant, and sizable, negative effect of pensions on fertility. This is in accordance with 
both the quality-quantity trade-off model and the old-age security motive, and against the kids as 
consumption good model based on parental time.
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
A graphical representation on this effect is shown in Figure 1. In the upper panel, average pre-reform 
fertility by years of contribution at the end of 1992 is shown. There is a clear increasing trend, which 
heavily depends on the link between age and years of contributions--an issue that we will address next. 
In the lower panel there is an equally clear decreasing trend in the average number of post-reform 
children. At first glance, when looking at simple nonparametric (moving average) trend estimates, there 
is a discontinuity of about 0.15 children corresponding to the reform. The low number of data points in 
terms of years of contributions, however, does not allow us to rely on a straightforward regression-
discontinuity estimation strategy. We will rather focus on regression models that explicitly control for 
the effect of age (as well as for other variables) when estimating the effect of the reforms.
Whether a person is affected or not by the reforms depends on the assumption of continuous labor 
market attachment and on the good measurement of the variable of our interest. Moreover, other 
covariates may influence the estimation of the reform effect. The results of the simple comparisons 
using t-tests displayed in Table 2 and of the discontinuity plots in Figure 1 are hence subject to 
limitations. In particular, given the link between age at entry in the labor market and exposure to the 
reform, we can expect that unaffected individuals are, on average, older than affected individuals. If we 
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take, as in Table 2, a one-year window around the reforms' threshold, we find that affected individuals 
(husbands) have an average age of 35.45 years, against an average age of 36.62 years for unaffected 
individuals. An average difference of one year in age translates almost equally into an average 
difference of one year in contributions. The same is true for the wives, as the average age of the wives 
of affected individuals is 31.67 years, against 32.91 years for the unaffected. Figures 2 and 3 show, 
however, that, despite the average one-year age difference between affected and unaffected individuals, 
there is a substantial amount of variability, with common support and an important overlap in the age 
distributions of affected and unaffected individuals, which allows us to identify the effect of reform, 
while controlling for the age of individuals (both husbands and wives). Therefore, in what follows we 
choose to develop a series of regression models that control for the different age distribution, as well as 
for other potentially influential factors. As we shall see, these models confirm the findings of the 
previous approach.
FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE
We therefore extend our analyses with the inclusion of a series of control variables which are likely to 
affect both inclusion into the treatment or control group and fertility outcomes. In particular, we control 
for age (and education) of the husband, age (and education) of the wife, geographical area (using the 
area of birth of the husband). In order to have a more robust sample size, we also extend our sample to 
include individuals who are more distant from the discontinuity induced by the reform. In the next 
section, we will also carry some additional sensitivity analyses for the robustness of our results.
Most analyses are conducted using a dataset where we compare individuals who are up to 7 years 
below the threshold number of years of contributions (and thus affected by the reform) with individuals 
who are up to 7 above the threshold (unaffected). The sample size is 2,675, with 59.65 percent of 
husbands being affected by the reform (92.89 percent of wives). Table 3 presents descriptive statistics 
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on this extended dataset (all variables, with the exception of fertility and reform refer to the time of the 
survey). We estimate simple OLS models of the type 
where fi is post-reform fertility for the i-th individual in our sample, reformiM is a dichotomous 
indicator (=1 if the  i-th husband is affected, =0 otherwise),  xi is a vector of control variables, Hi is 
white noise. The coefficient therefore allows to estimate the average effect of the reform on treated 
individuals on the number of post-reform children.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
In order to assess whether our findings are robust with respect to incentive effects on wives, we also 
estimate parallel models with the effect of reforms on both husbands and wives in the same household:
Here the coefficient allows to estimate therefore the average effect of the reform on treated 
husbands net of the effect on wives, which is estimated through .
In a second series of models we focuses on the probability that at least one post-reform child is born, 
with a probit specification: 
where is the inverse standard-normal distribution, and the estimated coefficient allows to 
estimate the average effect (via inverse Mill's ratio) of the reform on the probability of having at least 
one post-reform child for treated individuals. Analogously, we estimate probit models which include 
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the potential effect of the reform on women.
The data, however, contain more information than just the number of post-reform children. More 
specifically, we can also exploit information on the timing of births and build a discrete-time event-
history analysis model (see, e.g., Jenkins, 1995) with the adoption of a hazard rate approach to the 
timing of births (see, e.g., Newman and McCulloch, 1984). Moreover, we can exploit the fact that some 
of the factors we focus on vary over the observation time (this is the case of husband's and wife's ages, 
or calendar year). To this purpose, we build a second dataset that contains observations in terms of 
persons-years, i.e., an entry for each individual i in each given year of observation t, from 1993 
onwards. In this second dataset, the age of husbands and wives is updated every year. The appropriate 
method to analyze persons-years datasets is discrete-time event history analysis. Each household 
contributes to the sample as long as they are observed, and they leave the sample either when they are 
interviewed (in this case information is right-censored) or when they have another child. As the number 
of post-reform children is low on average, we only consider the progression to the first birth after the 
reform. Therefore, with the second dataset, we use a discrete-time probit specification, where the left-
hand-side variable is the hazard rate, i.e., the annual probability of having an additional birth for the 
individual i during the year t, given that the same individual has not yet had an additional birth in 
earlier years of observation: 
In this equation, Bi denotes the time of first post-reform birth, t is the year of observation, potentially 
between 1993 (t=1) and 2006 (t=14), ( t=1,…,Ji, where Ji=14 is the last year of observation for the i-th 
individual), xi is a vector of time-constant control variables, Qij is a vector of variables that vary across 
years. is related the estimated average effect (via inverse Mill's ratio) of the reform on the yearly 
hazard of a post-reform birth for treated individuals. Also in this case, we will control for wives' 
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potential reform effect.
RESULTS 
We now examine the results of our analyses (complete results of regressions and scripts are available 
upon request from the authors), starting from our first dataset. Table 4 displays the results on the effect 
of the reform on the: a) number of children born starting from the year after each of the reforms and 
until the date of the survey (column (1), OLS as in eq. regress; column (2), OLS as in eq. regress wife); 
b) probability of having an additional child during the same period (columns (3) Probit, as in eq. 
probit1; column (4) controlling for wives' reform). The estimated effects of the reforms on husbands 
are displayed in the Reform line (in terms of marginal effects for the Probit). The estimated effects of 
the reforms on wives are displayed in the "Wife's reform" line. In these regressions, we control for 
several elements that may affect the number of years of contributions individuals had up to the end of 
1992 and their fertility behavior. In particular, we control for: age of husbands and wives (using age 
fixed-effects), level of education of husbands and of wives, geographical area, and the number of kids 
that they already had prior to the reforms. As might be expected, some of these controls have a 
significant effect. For instance, more educated women -- who presumably decided to postpone fertility 
-- are more likely to have kids after the reform. Individuals in the South are more likely to have 
children, whereas individuals who had more kids prior to the reform are less likely to have additional 
children afterwards. 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
According to these estimates, after controlling for all these covariates, the average number of children 
for treated couples is 0.0542 higher (significant at the 10% level). This effect only slightly diminishes 
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when controlling for the effect of the reform on wives. Interestingly, the effect on wives is positive, in 
accordance with theory, albeit not statistically significant, perhaps due to the small sample of 
unaffected wives. The magnitude of the first effect (on husbands) should be compared to an average of 
0.5089 post-reform children (i.e., it amounts to 10.7% higher fertility for affected individuals). Results 
of regression models on the larger sample of individuals therefore confirm the findings obtained with 
the smaller time window around the reform. Coupled with the estimates of Attanasio and Brugiavini 
(2003) on the effect of pension wealth of the reforms, our estimates suggest that a 1 per cent decrease 
in pension wealth increases fertility by 0.26 per cent. This is therefore slightly higher than the effect 
obtained by Gábos, Gál and Kézdi (2009) using time-series, who estimate that a 1 per cent decrease in 
pensions increases fertility by 0.2 per cent, with a magnitude similar to a 1 per cent increase in child-
related benefits.
Results on the Probit model on the probability of having an additional post-reform child also point 
towards the same direction: individuals who are affected by the reform have a 7.1% higher probability 
of having post-1992 reform children. Also the effect of the reform due to the change in the wives' 
future pension benefits is positive, as predicted by all fertility theories, and statistically significant.
Therefore, the findings from this set of regression models confirm that the joint effects of the two 
reforms (post-1992) is statistically significant, and strong.
From now onwards, our results refer to the second dataset, i.e., the one with discrete-time data on 
persons years, and to estimates based on eq. probit2. We specify a model in which we estimate the joint 
effect of the reforms, i.e., the post-1992 effect. Table 5 displays the results of a first probit hazard 
model, in which age of the husband and age of the wife (using fixed-effects) are time-varying 
covariates, and in which we control for fixed period effects using dummy variables for each year. The 
marginal effect of the reform on the annual probability of having an additional birth is 0.67%. This 
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effect can be compared to the observed (average) annual probability, which is above 5%. The reform is 
estimated to raise the annual probability of having a(nother) child by 12.9% in relative terms. The 
effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. This analysis, which makes use of additional 
information contained in the data and controls for time-varying effects, thus confirms the results 
obtained with the first dataset.
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
We also ran two types of robustness checks for the reform effect using the second dataset (similar 
robustness checks have been run on the first dataset giving analogous results). A first robustness check 
regards the size of the time window around the reform that we use. Our standard models use a +/-7
year-wide window. The fact that age (controlled via fixed effects) is not behind the estimated effect is 
reassuring, but we conduct a robustness check by using shorter time windows around the reform. Table 
6 contains the output of such checks, compared to the reform effect displayed in Table 5. The effect is 
stable with a +/- 3 year window. It is much higher, still significantly positive, but estimated with lower 
precision, as the window becomes the smallest one (+/- 1 year). The stability of the estimates with the 
variation of the time window is a sign of robustness of the positive effect of the reform on fertility, 
while the fact that the effect becomes higher with the shorter window is consistent with the effect of 
reform being captured in a cleaner way with the shorter window.
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
A second robustness check of our identification strategy is a "placebo" test, which is often used in 
studies on natural experiment, like ours, which exploit discontinuities. More specifically, we estimate 
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the effect of two discontinuities that we expect not to matter, as they are in fact not related to the 
reform. A first discontinuity (Younger placebo) is placed around 10 years of contributions in 1992, 
with a window of +/- 1 years around the discontinuity. A second discontinuity (Older placebo) is 
placed around 20 years of contributions in 1992, with a window of +/- 1 years around the discontinuity. 
The estimates of placebo effects are compared with the estimates of the reform effect with a +/-1 years 
time window in Table 7. Indeed, placebo effects are not statistically significant, which is what we 
expect if our identification strategy through a discontinuity in years of contributions picks the reform 
effect: only the discontinuity around the actual reform matters.
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
In a contemporary low fertility society, characterized by strong family ties -- Italy, we have exploited 
the discontinuity induced by two parallel pension reforms held in 1992 and 1995 to test the effect of a 
change in future family income on fertility. These reforms have in fact generated a natural experiment 
that has exogenously reduced the pension income prospects of individuals with years of contribution 
below specific thresholds, while leaving others unaffected. Our results show that individuals who have 
lower pension income prospects, because they are affected by the reform, have significantly higher 
fertility. The relative increase of the realized fertility or of the probability of having a child is above 
10%. The strong impact is entirely due to a negative income effect on the husbands' future pension 
benefits. We are thus able to establish the existence of a causal, negative effect of husbands' income on 
wives' fertility.
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Interestingly, these findings are not in line with the "consumption" theories of fertility based on 
parental time. Perhaps surprisingly, they are in line either with the original Becker-Lewis version of the 
"consumption theory" based on the interaction between quality and quantity or with the old-age 
security motive for fertility. The latter case would also be consistent with the existence of strong family 
ties in the Italian (Dalla Zuanna 2001; Reher 1998), as well as in several other contemporary developed 
societies.4 In this environment of family culture, parents may reasonably expect their kids to give them 
old-age support, for instance as in-kind, monetary transfers or co-residence.
We believe that our results are of general relevance for the study of fertility motives in developed 
societies, as they contribute to identify a clear negative impact of pension policy on fertility decisions. 
This is of particular relevance to the study of very-low and lowest-low fertility. If part of the fertility 
decline can be attributed to the diffusion of pension systems, the introduction of pension reforms that 
decrease the income prospects after retirement might contribute to a rise in fertility. Indeed, fertility in 
Italy had its minimum in 1996 and since then it is slowly rising. Further empirical evidence is needed 
on the contribution of the old-age security motive to total fertility in contemporary societies.
4According to a measure of the strength of family ties constructed by Alesina and Giuliano (2007), 
Italy ranks third among the OECD countries, after Mexico and Poland and followed closely by the US 
and Spain, while Germany and the Scandinavian countries have the weakest family ties.
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TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1. Pension reforms of the 1990s in Italy
Pre-1993 regime 1992 reform 1995 reform
Normal retirement age 60 (men)
55(women)
65 (men)
60(women)
Any age after 56 (for both 
men and women)
Transitional period Until about 2032      Until about 2035
Pensionable earnings Average of last 5 years 
real earnings (converted 
to real values through 
price index)
Career average earnings 
(converted to real values 
through price index + 
1%)
Career contributions 
(capitalized  using a 5-
year moving average of 
GDP growth rate)
Pension benefit 2%*(pensionable 
earnings)*(t),
where t is years of tax 
payments (at most 40)
2%*(pensionable 
earnings)*(t),
where t is years of tax 
payments (at most 40)
Proportional to 
capitalized value of 
career contributions, the 
proportionality factor 
increasing with age at 
retirement (from .04720 
at age 57 to .06136 at age 
65) 
Pension indexation Cost of living plus real 
earnings growth
Cost of living Cost of living
Pension to survivor 60% to spouse
20% to each child
40% to each child (if no 
spouse)
Same Same
Years of contributions 
for eligibility
15 20 5
Early retirement 
provision
Any age if contributed to 
SS for 35 years or more,
no actuarial adjustment
Any age if contributed to 
SS for 35 years or more, 
no actuarial adjustment
No early retirement 
provision
Total Payroll tax 24.5% of gross earnings 27.17% of gross earnings 32.7% of gross earnings
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Table 1. Differences between husbands who are affected and unaffected by the reforms. +/- 1 year-window around 
the reforms’ thresholds.
Unaffected
(up to - 1 year)
Affected
(up to +1 year)
Number of children (up to 1993) 1.3850 1.3788
(0.0746) (0.0802)
Number of children (after 1993) 0.3050 0.4899***
(0.0414) (0.0468)
Total number of children (up to 2006) 1.6900
(0.0670)
1.8687*
(0.0772)
N 200 198
Standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels on the 2-tail t-test on the hypothesis of difference between the affected and the unaffected: * significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: own analyses on Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (joint dataset waves 1998, 2000, 2002, 
2004, 2006). 
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Figure 1. Mean number of children before 1993 (upper panel) and 1993 onwards (lower panel) 
by years of contribution at the end of 1992. Husbands affected by the reform to the left (up to 14 
years), individuals unaffected by the reform to the right (15 years and over). Marks are empirical 
means, lines represent nonparametric smoothed values (3-values moving average up to the 
discontinuity point.
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Figure 2. Age distribution in 1993 for husbands unaffected and affected by the reforms. Window: 
+/- 1 year of contributions around the reforms’ thresholds. Wives born 1955 or after.
Mean age in 1993 for N=200 unaffected husbands is  36.62 years, for N=198 affected husbands is 
35.45 years. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-test).
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Figure 3. Age distribution in 1993 for wives whose husbands have been unaffected and affected 
by the reforms. Window: +/- 1 year of contributions around the reforms’ thresholds for 
husbands. Wives born 1955 or after.
Mean wife’s age in 1993 for N=200 with unaffected husbands is 32.91 years, for N=198 with affected 
husbands is 31.67 years. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level (t-test).
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for variables used in subsequent analyses. Window: +/- 7 years of contributions around 
the reforms’ thresholds for husbands. Wives born 1955 or after.
Mean s.d.
Reform (dummy) 0.5965
Wife’s reform (dummy) 0.9289
Number of children (up to 1993) 1.2522 1.0260
Number of children (after 1993) 0.5089 0.7338
Education (husband, years) 10.4411 3.4473
Education (wife, years) 10.6971 3.4377
Age at interview (husband) 45.6997 5.4437
Age at interview (wife) 41.6651 5.1768
Center as area of birth (dummy) .1803
South as area of birth (dummy) .3882
Survey year 1998 (dummy) .0384
Survey year 2000 (dummy) .2086
Survey year 2002 (dummy) .2198
Survey year 2004 (dummy) .1907
N 2675
Source: own analyses on Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (joint dataset waves 1998, 2000, 2002, 
2004, 2006). 
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Table 4. Effect of pension reforms on post-reform fertility (total number of children or 
probability of having at least an additional child). Window: +/- 7 years of contributions around 
the reforms’ thresholds for husbands. Wives born 1955 or after.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS Model 1 OLS Model 2 Probit Model 1
(marginal effect)
Probit Model 2
(marginal effect)
Reform 0.0542* 0.0487* 0.0714*** 0.0646***
(0.0287) (0.0289) (0.0248) (0.0250)
Wife’s reform 0.0749 0.0966**
(0.0496) (0.0442)
Education 
(husband)
0.00413 0.00432 0.00472 0.00497
(0.00437) (0.00437) (0.00391) (0.00391)
Education 
(wife)
0.0169*** 0.0165*** 0.0161*** 0.0155***
(0.00428) (0.00429) (0.00378) (0.00378)
Center -0.00391 -0.00660 0.0286 0.0262
(0.0339) (0.0340) (0.0300) (0.0300)
South 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.0833*** 0.0776***
(0.0287) (0.0289) (0.0254) (0.0255)
Year 1998 -0.736*** -0.728*** -0.342*** -0.340***
(0.0730) (0.0731) (0.0168) (0.0172)
Year 2000 -0.457*** -0.450*** -0.292*** -0.287***
(0.0413) (0.0415) (0.0251) (0.0255)
Year 2002 -0.321*** -0.317*** -0.215*** -0.211***
(0.0369) (0.0370) (0.0259) (0.0261)
Year 2004 -0.147*** -0.145*** -0.101*** -0.0992***
(0.0361) (0.0361) (0.0284) (0.0284)
Number of children 
(up to 1993)
-0.175*** -0.176*** -0.131*** -0.132***
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0127) (0.0127)
Age fixed effects 
(husband) 
YES YES YES YES
Age fixed effects 
(wife) 
YES YES YES YES
N 2675 2675 2652 2652
R-squared 0.321 0.321
Observed P 0.3839 0.3839
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5. Marginal effect of pension reforms on the annual probability of having an additional child (discrete-time 
probit event-history model on persons-years). Window: +/- 7 years of contributions around the reforms’ thresholds 
for husbands. Wives born 1955 or after.
Person-period 
Probit Model 1
Person-period 
Probit Model 2
Reform 0.00672** 0.00618**
(0.00286) (0.00288)
Wife’s reform 0.00790
(0.00518)
Education (husband) 0.000513 0.000526
(0.000428) (0.000427)
Education (wife) 0.00155*** 0.00151***
(0.000402) (0.000402)
Center 0.00980*** 0.00941***
(0.00285) (0.00285)
South 0.00264 0.00244
(0.00326) (0.00325)
Number of children (up to 1993) -0.0144*** -0.0145***
(0.00147) (0.00147)
Age fixed effects (husband, time-
varying)
YES YES
Age fixed effects (wife, time-
varying)
YES YES
Year fixed effects (husband, time-
varying)
YES YES
Year fixed effects (wife, time-
varying)
YES YES
N (persons-years) 19708 19708
Observed P 0.0521 0.0521
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6. Marginal effect of pension reforms on the annual probability of having an additional child (discrete-time 
probit event-history model on persons-years) (varying window around the reforms’ thresholds for husbands, wives
born 1955 or after).
(1)
window: 
+/- 7 years
(2)
window: 
+/- 3 years
(3)
window: 
+/- 1 year
Reform 0.00672** 0.00662* 0.0170**
(0.00286) (0.00341) (0.00726)
N (persons-
years)
19708 9150 2447
Observed P 0.0521 0.0483 0.0527
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: own analyses on Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (joint dataset waves 1998, 2000, 2002, 
2004, 2006, persons-years reconstruction). 
Same control variables as for the models in Table 4.
37
Table 7. Marginal effect of pension reforms on the annual probability of having an additional child (discrete-time 
probit event-history model on persons-years). Placebo test (one-year window around different contribution 
thresholds for husbands, wives born 1955 or after).
(1)
“Younger” 
placebo 
(window: 
+/- 1 year)
(2)
Real 
reform 
(window: 
+/- 1 year)
(3)
“Older” 
placebo  
(window: 
+/- 1 year)
Reform -0.0096 0.0170** 0.0043
(0.0118) (0.00726) (0.0049)
N (persons-
years)
2197 2447 1137
Observed P 0.0992 0.0527 0.0237
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Source: own analyses on Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth (joint dataset waves 1998, 2000, 2002, 
2004, persons-years reconstruction). 
Same control variables as for the models in Table 4. The “Younger” placebo model estimates the effect of a discontinuity 
around 10 years of contributions in 1992, with a window of +/- 1 year around the discontinuity. The “Older” placebo 
model estimates the effect of a discontinuity around 20 years of contributions in 1992, with a window of +/- 1 year around 
the discontinuity.
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